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Abstract 
This paper investigates the causal nexus between the pattern of ownership structure in Indian service sector 
companies and its stock price volatility. Ownership structure consists of promoter holdings, public 
shareholdings, institutional and non institutional holdings. Media and entertainment sector 16 listed firms sample 
was taken for the study and it is found that largest shareholder in this sector is promoters, who hold more than 
58% stake in the firm. Public shareholding is the second largest. Institutional and non institutional investors have 
less than 25% shareholdings. Volatility is measured using standard Deviation and GARCH (1,1) is used to check 
the volatility persistence. It is found that price volatility is not significantly influenced by the firm ownership 
structure. This agrees with the notion that the price volatility is largely influenced by external macro economic 
variables and speculative forces of the market and internal factors like leverage and ownership structure has no 
significant influence on stock price volatility.  
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Introduction 
Stock price volatility thou influenced by both internal and external factors, corporate governance related issues 
always drives the price volatility in a significant manner. The percentage of stocks held by each category of 
investors is imperative information, as it determines the number of stocks available for trading in the market at a 
given point of time. When a firm has less percentage of shares issued to the public and largest shareholder is the 
proprietors, it leads to less liquidity due to less number of shares available for trading in the market. SEBI in 
India has mandated 25% minimum public shareholding to bring in more retail participation and infuse liquidity 
in to the market. Proprietors with better access to information will have information advantage and abnormal 
return as compared to public shareholders. Compared to investors, managers have superior information about 
their firm’s investment opportunities and issue stock when it is overvalued; security prices therefore fall upon 
issuance since investors are wary of an information asymmetry problem (Myers (1984)). This information 
asymmetric causes for price volatility. This is a matter of corporate governance and needs attention of the 
regulatory system and curtails market volatility.  In this study it is observed that the largest shareholders in the 
media and entertainment sector in listed companies are promoters. Public shareholding is less and more volatile 
stocks have more promoter shareholdings. This leads to conflict of interest between agent and principal. As per 
the agency cost theory internal cost that arises must be paid to an agent acting on behalf of a principal. Agency 
costs arise because of core problems such as conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. 
Shareholders wish for management to run the company in a way that increases shareholder value. But 
management may wish to grow the company in ways that maximize their personal power and wealth that may 
not be in the best interests of shareholders. As per pecking order theory the cost of corporate financing increases 
with asymmetric information. Financing comes from three sources, internal funds, debt and new equity. This 
leads to liquidity and stock return volatility.  
 
Literature review 
(Martin T. Bohl, Janusz Brzeszczyn ski b, and Bernd Wilflinga (2009)), provide empirical evidence on the 
impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics. Performing Markov-switching-GARCH 
analysis evidences prove that the increase of institutional ownership has temporarily changed the volatility 
structure of aggregate stock returns. (Yabei Hu and Shigemi Izumida (2008)), laid the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance from two perspectives namely, ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership. It focused on reasons for discrepancies among previous empirical 
research on ownership structure comprising of corporate governance environments, data issues, variable 
measurements, and estimation methods. (Nendi Juhandi, Made Sudarma, Siti Aisjah, Rofiaty (2013)), studied the 
effects of internal factors and stock ownership structure on dividend policy and their impacts on company’s 
value. It also examined the influence of dividend policy on company’s value. The results found proved that 
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managerial ownership has no effect on dividend policy but on company’s value, while institutional ownership 
positively and significantly affects dividend payment and company’s value. This shows that corporate 
management is a representation of company’s ownership as a company’s control. (Baskin, 1989) has found 
significant negative relationship between dividend yield and volatility of stock’s price. Findings of (Hussainey et 
al., 2011) also failed to support the study of (Baskin, 1989).  
 
Methodology 
The objective of the study is to determine the ownership structure of media and entertainment sector and its 
composition relationship with the stock price volatility. The study attempts to verify the notion of largest public 
participation in the market leads to abnormal volatility in the sector. Data for this study is taken from the listed 
media and Entertainment companies in National stock exchange of India. The sample is derived from CNX500 
index which includes 16 companies of media and entertainment sector. CNX 500 is India’s first broad based 
benchmark of the Indian capital market. The CNX 500 Index represents about 95.77% of the free float market 
capitalization of the stocks listed on NSE. The daily stock closing price data is taken from NSE website. 
Ownership structure data is taken from CMIE prowess data base. The sample period of the study is 2009 to 
2015. Stock volatility is the uncertainty or risk about the size of changes in a security's value. A higher volatility 
means that a security's value can potentially be spread out over a larger range of values. This means that the 
price of the stock can change considerably over a short time period in either ways. A lower volatility means that 
a stock value does not fluctuate dramatically, but changes in value at a steady pace over a period of time. 
Volatility is measured using standard deviation of the log stock returns. 
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Granger causality test is used to check the causal effect between the variables. It is a statistical concept of 
causality that is based on prediction. According to Granger causality, if a signal X1 "Granger-causes" (or "G-
causes") a signal X2, then past values of X1 should contain information that helps predict X2 above and beyond 
the information contained in past values of X2 alone. It is computed with the help of following equation. 
 
 
 
Jarque–Bera test is performed for sample companies to check the goodness-of-fit and verify whether sample data 
have the skewness and kurtosis matching a normal distribution. If the data come from a normal distribution, the 
JB statistic asymptotically has a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom, so the statistic can be 
used to test the hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution. It is computed with the help of following 
equation. 
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Results and Discussions 
Table 01 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Min Max Count 
Promoter Holdings 58.359 61.105 15.029 225.874 -0.929 29.510 78.100 16 
Public Holdings 41.599 38.895 14.960 223.787 -0.937 21.900 70.490 16 
Institutional  
shareholders 
23.665 21.965 14.919 222.563 -0.019 3.060 53.020 16 
Non Institutional  
shareholders 
17.934 17.670 12.631 159.550 -1.094 3.500 39.280 16 
ADR/GDR 0.042 0.000 0.177 0.031 18.000 0.000 0.750 16 
 
Among the sample media and health care firms that are listed in Indian National stock exchange, promoter’s 
shareholdings represent largest stake in the sector. Promoters are the largest block holders with mean holding of 
58.35% in the industry. Public shareholdings are the second largest with the mean of 41.595. Institutional 
shareholders and non institutional investors have 23.66% and 17.935 respectively. Largest shareholders 
influence the market liquidity and volatility of the stock price. Their ability to trade in large quantity influences 
the market volumes and returns. This also leads to information asymmetric effect as the promoters have better 
access to vital information. Table 02 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample firms and confirms the 
normality of the time series data as tested through the Jarque-Bera test. It is significant at 1% level and confirms 
that there is no unit root. 
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Table 02 
Descriptive statistics and Stationarity Test Results 
 Sample Firms  Mean  Median  Max  Min  SD  Skew  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Prob 
Dbcorp 0.001 0.000 0.063 -0.049 0.016 0.425 4.628 32.462 0.000 
Den -0.002 -0.004 0.182 -0.131 0.033 0.546 8.071 258.993 0.000 
Enil 0.003 0.001 0.163 -0.055 0.023 1.714 13.202 1114.901 0.000 
Erosmedia 0.004 0.001 0.155 -0.088 0.030 0.567 5.671 81.086 0.000 
Hathway 0.001 0.000 0.085 -0.069 0.024 0.473 3.850 15.559 0.000 
Htmedia -0.007 -0.001 0.123 -1.654 0.112 -13.843 204.322 397482 0.000 
Inoxleisur 0.002 0.000 0.110 -0.063 0.023 0.928 6.450 147.668 0.000 
Jagran 0.001 0.001 0.051 -0.063 0.017 0.017 4.474 20.930 0.000 
Navnetedul 0.003 -0.001 0.141 -0.063 0.022 1.858 11.290 794.371 0.000 
Ndtv 0.002 -0.003 0.182 -0.125 0.041 1.414 8.156 332.852 0.000 
Pvr 0.001 -0.002 0.084 -0.055 0.023 0.729 4.594 44.917 0.000 
Suntv 0.000 0.000 0.118 -0.088 0.027 0.539 6.386 121.533 0.000 
Tv18brdcst 0.001 -0.002 0.103 -0.085 0.025 0.698 5.588 83.208 0.000 
Tvtoday 0.003 -0.002 0.182 -0.181 0.036 0.552 10.665 577.209 0.000 
Zeel 0.001 0.000 0.056 -0.062 0.019 0.249 3.618 6.063 0.048 
 
Table 03 
Ownership Structure and Stock Volatility 
  
Promot
er 
holding
s 
Public 
holding 
Institutional 
shareholders 
Non-Institutional 
shareholders 
Volatili
ty (%) 
Skew
ness 
Kurtos
is 
D.B.Corp Ltd. 69.960 30.040 26.520 3.520 2% 0.425 4.628 
Den Networks Ltd. 40.050 59.950 22.240 37.720 3% 0.546 8.071 
Entertainment 
Network India Ltd. 
71.150 28.850 18.320 10.530 2% 1.714 13.202 
Eros Intl Media Ltd. 74.410 25.590 20.480 5.110 3% 0.567 5.671 
HT Media Ltd. 69.510 30.490 22.810 7.680 11% 0.473 3.850 
Hathway Cable & 
Datacom Ltd. 
43.480 56.520 53.020 3.500 2% 
-
13.84
3 
204.32
2 
Inox Leisure Ltd. 48.700 51.300 28.270 23.030 2% 0.928 6.450 
Jagran Prakashan 
Ltd. 
60.760 39.240 28.460 10.780 2% 0.017 4.474 
NDTV Ltd. 61.450 38.550 6.830 31.720 4% 1.858 11.290 
Navneet Education 
Ltd. 
61.800 38.200 21.690 16.510 2% 1.414 8.156 
PVR Ltd. 29.510 70.490 31.210 39.280 2% 0.729 4.594 
Sun TV Network 
Ltd. 
75.000 25.000 19.950 5.050 3% 0.539 6.386 
TV Today Network 
Ltd. 
57.420 42.580 4.360 38.220 4% 0.698 5.588 
TV18 Broadcast Ltd. 60.400 39.600 11.670 27.930 3% 0.552 10.665 
Zee Entertainment 
Enterprises Ltd. 
43.070 56.930 52.150 4.780 2% 0.249 3.618 
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Table 04 indicates the ownership structure and volatility of stock returns. It is found that most of the stocks have 
largest shareholding by promoters and public. Promoters have an average of 58% stake in the company and the 
Network18 has the largest percentage of promoter’s shares with volatility of 2%.  
Table 04 
Correlation matrix 
 
Institutional 
Shareholders 
Non Institutional 
Shareholders Promoter Public Volatility 
Institutional 
Shareholders  1.000000 -0.465701 -0.559780  0.559780 -0.155441 
Non Institutional 
Shareholders -0.465701  1.000000 -0.472610  0.472610 -0.028890 
Promoter -0.559780 -0.472610  1.000000 -1.000000  0.181896 
Public  0.559780  0.472610 -1.000000  1.000000 -0.181896 
Volatility -0.155441 -0.028890  0.181896 -0.181896  1.000000 
Volatility of stock returns represents the changes in the prices of shares and it is believed to be more, when firm 
has more public shareholding than promoters. Correlation matrix table shows that stock price volatility and 
percentage of shares held by promoters is positively correlated, whereas the public shareholding, institutional 
and non institutional shareholdings has negative correlations. Public, Institutional and non institutional 
shareholding is positively correlated. As per pecking order theory, firms first prefer internal financing, and then 
debt, lastly raising through equity. This theory maintains that businesses adhere to a hierarchy of financing 
sources and prefer internal financing when available, and debt is preferred over equity if external financing is 
required.  
Table 05 
Table showing Volatility estimates GARCH (1,1) Results 
 
Sample Firms Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
Den 0.137970 0.026254 5.255142 0.0000* 
Enil 0.053581 0.034942 1.533436 0.1252 
Erosmedia -0.001756 0.032267 -0.054433 0.9566 
Hathway 0.064347 0.038311 1.679601 0.0930 
Htmedia -0.005758 0.038556 -0.149353 0.8813 
Inoxleisur 0.006463 0.045394 0.142380 0.8868 
Jagran 0.191327 0.064116 2.984090 0.0028* 
Navnetedul -0.015954 0.052671 -0.302906 0.7620 
Ndtv -0.001129 0.026952 -0.041903 0.9666 
Pvr 0.029217 0.043197 0.676360 0.4988 
Suntv -0.009831 0.040093 -0.245215 0.8063 
Tv18brdcst -0.043571 0.040267 -1.082040 0.2792 
Tvtoday 0.030179 0.035041 0.861236 0.3891 
Zeel 0.013531 0.066359 0.203904 0.8384 
C 0.000500 0.001013 0.493579 0.6216 
 
Variance Equation 
C 0.000121 4.12E-05 2.951322 0.0032 
RESID(-1)^2 0.347956 0.144842 2.402309 0.0163 
GARCH(-1) 0.163978 0.209700 0.781962 0.4342 
R-squared 0.127564 Mean dependent var 0.000776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057933 S.D. dependent var 0.015930 
S.E. of regression 0.015462 Akaike info criterion -5.455448 
Sum squared resid 0.050922 Schwarz criterion -5.187207 
Log likelihood 648.1042 F-statistic 1.831994 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.144520 Prob(F-statistic) 0.025833 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.17, 2015 
 
129 
 
Volatility clusters, means that the variance appears to be high during certain periods and low in other periods 
often implies an ARMA process in the variance of the process. If the previous period was characterized as high 
volatility the present and the near future periods are likely to have a high variance as well. Volatility clusters are 
typical for financial price and return series, exchange rates and in action rates. In particular, high frequency 
observations likely to display volatility clustering that can be modelled by ARCH/GARCH methods. 
 
Table 05 shows the GARCH test Results. Volatility persistence is studied with equation of Garch = C(16) + 
C(17)*Resid(-1)^2 + C(18)*Garch(-1). It is found that the return volatility coefficient is positive for two firms 
with significance level at 1%. It confirms the GARCH effect and persistent volatility. Granger causality test is a 
statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting another. Table 06 
shows the granger causality test results for the sample firms volatility and ownership structure. Probability 
values should be less than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis. From the above table it is found that null hypothesis 
is accepted as the P value is greater than 0.05. Therefore, it is proved that ownership structure has no granger 
cause effect on stock price volatility.  
Table 06 
Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
 Non institutional shareholders does not granger cause institutional shareholders  0.53229  0.60466 
  Institutional shareholders does not granger cause non institutional shareholders  0.64763  0.54604 
  Promoter does not granger cause institutional shareholders  0.53230  0.60466 
  Institutional shareholders does not granger cause promoter  0.18691  0.83266 
  Public does not granger cause institutional shareholders  0.53230  0.60466 
  Institutional shareholders does not granger cause public  0.18691  0.83266 
  Volatility does not granger cause institutional shareholders  2.34041  0.15191 
  Institutional shareholders does not granger cause volatility  0.20094  0.82154 
  Promoter does not granger cause non institutional shareholders  0.64761  0.54605 
  Non institutional shareholders does not granger cause promoter  0.18707  0.83253 
  Public does not granger cause non institutional shareholders  0.64761  0.54605 
  Non institutional shareholders does not granger cause public  0.18707  0.83253 
  Volatility does not granger cause non institutional shareholders  0.89083  0.44361 
  Non institutional shareholders does not granger cause volatility  3.20854  0.08873 
  Volatility does not granger cause promoter  0.63351  0.55283 
  Promoter does not granger cause volatility  1.62000  0.25065 
  Volatility does not granger cause public  0.63351  0.55283 
  Public does not granger cause volatility  1.62000  0.25065 
 
Conclusion 
Ownership structure of media and entertainment sector firms in India consists of promoter, Public, Institutional 
and non institutional investors. Largest shareholder in this sector is promoters, who hold more than 58% stake in 
the firm. Public shareholding is the second largest. Institutional and non institutional investors have less than 
25% shareholdings. The study was intended to verify whether the structure of firm ownership shareholding 
influence the stock price volatility. It is found that price volatility is not significantly influenced by the firm 
ownership structure. This agrees with the notion that the price volatility is largely influenced by external macro 
economic variables and speculative forces of the market and internal factors like leverage and ownership 
structure has no significant influence on stock price volatility.  
 
References 
Azzam, I. (2010). The Impact of Institutional Ownership and Dividend Policy on Stock Returns and Volatility : 
Evidence from Egypt Islam Azzam. International Journal of Business, 15(4), 443–458. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.17, 2015 
 
130 
Bohl, M. T., Brzeszczyński, J., & Wilfling, B. (2009). Institutional investors and stock returns volatility: 
Empirical evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(2), 170–182. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2008.02.003 
Di, T., Di, O., In, R., & La, C. E. (n.d.). Does Ownership Structure Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility ? 
Submitted by Dr Cristina Cella. 
Ezazi, M. E., Faculty, A., Sadeghi, S. J., Alipour, M., Branch, Z., & Amjadi, H. (2011). The Effect of Ownership 
Structure on Share Price Volatility of Listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange : An Empirical Evidence of 
Iran, 2(5), 163–169. 
Hagen, Ø., & Ehling, P. (2009). Ownership Structure and Investor Behavior. 
Hashemijoo, M., Mahdavi Ardekani, A., & Younesi, N. (2012). The Impact of Dividend Policy on Share Price 
Volatility in the Malaysian Stock Market. Journal of Business Studies Quarterly, 4(1), 111–129. Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=9
1711854&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Hauser, S., Hauser, S., Lauterbach, B., Lauterbach, B., Analysis, Q., & Analysis, Q. (2003). The impact of 
minimum trading units on stock value and price volatility, (MARCH 2002). http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.314389 
Hotchkiss, E. S., & Strickland, D. (2000). Does Shareholder Composition affect Stock Returns? 
Hu, Y., & Izumida, S. (2009). The Relationship between Ownership and Performance: A Review of Theory and 
Evidence. International Business Research, 1(4), 72–81. http://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v1n4p72 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976a). Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior , Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior , Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976b). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. http://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(76)90026-X 
Juhandi, N., Sudarma, M., & Aisjah, S. (2011). The Effects of Internal factors and Stock Ownership Structure on 
Dividend Policy o n Company ’ s Value [ A Study on Manufacturing Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange ( IDX )], 2(11), 6–18. 
Kadlec, G. B., & McConnell, J. J. (1994). The Effect of Market Segmentation and Illiquidity on Asset Prices: 
Evidence from Exchange Listings. Journal of Finance, 49(2), 611–636. http://doi.org/10.2307/2329165 
Nishat, M., & Irfan, C. (2001). Dividend policy and stock price volatility in Pakistan. Th Annual General 
Meeting of PSDE, Pakistan …, 5(2), 1–7. Retrieved from http://72.9.146.122/pdf/psde 19agm/dividend policy 
and stock price volatility.doc 
Saffi, P., Sturgess, J., & Pearson, a. (2009). Equity Lending Markets and Ownership Structure. IESE Research 
Papers, 3(February). Retrieved from http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0836-E.pdf 
Sterne, P. (2012). An Alternative Stock Market Structure that Provides Automatic Liquidity and Reduced 
Volatility, 1–9. 
Suresha, B., & Murugan, N. (2014). Causal Nexus between Firm Ownership Structure and Market Liquidity, 
4(12), 14–24. 
Zhou, X. (2001). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and 
performance: Comment. Journal of Financial Economics (Vol. 62). http://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(01)00085-X 
 
 
 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
